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Abstract 
 
‘Scepticism’ in public attitudes towards climate change is seen as a significant barrier 
to public engagement. In an experimental study, we measured participants’ scepticism 
about climate change before and after reading two newspaper editorials that made 
opposing claims about the reality and seriousness of climate change (designed to 
generate uncertainty). A well-established social psychological finding is that people 
with opposing attitudes often assimilate evidence in a way that is biased towards their 
existing attitudinal position, which may lead to attitude polarisation. We found that 
people who were less sceptical about climate change evaluated the convincingness 
and reliability of the editorials in a markedly different way to people who were more 
sceptical about climate change, demonstrating biased assimilation of the information. 
In both groups, attitudes towards climate change became significantly more sceptical 
after reading the editorials, but we observed no evidence of attitude polarisation – 
that is, the attitudes of these two groups did not diverge. The results are the first 
application of the well-established assimilation and polarisation paradigm to attitudes 
about climate change, with important implications for anticipating how uncertainty – 
in the form of conflicting information – may impact on public engagement with 
climate change. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Key words: Climate change, uncertainty, scepticism, biased assimilation, attitude 
polarisation 
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Introduction – Uncertainty, climate change & public engagement 
Despite the well-established body of scientific evidence that the warming of the Earth 
over the last half-century has been caused largely by human activity (for a recent 
summary, see Royal Society, 2010), debates about climate change are characterised 
by an enormous amount of uncertainty (Zehr, 2000).1 This is because climate change 
is a multi-facetted and complex phenomenon, founded on an extensive body of 
interdisciplinary science and with deeply challenging policy implications (e.g., Prins 
et al, 2010). While a great deal is known about the climate system (and the question of 
anthropogenic influence), many uncertainties remain. Some are quantifiable (albeit 
with sophisticated probabilistic statistics – e.g., UK Climate Impact Programme, 
2009), but others are harder to pin down. As in any other scientific discipline, 
uncertainty is an inherent feature and a stimulus that drives progress rather than a 
weakness that holds it back.  
 
But in debates about climate change, social and human issues are interwoven with 
scientific and technical ones (Wynne, 2010). This broader conception of climate 
change – as much more than just a scientific issue – introduces types of uncertainty 
that are much harder to quantify. People disagree about the reality, seriousness and 
consequences of climate change because it (socially) means very different things to 
different people (Hulme, 2009). These social uncertainties reflect differences in 
personal values and political ideologies, and are very different from the type of 
uncertainty that scientists typically encounter when formulating assessments of 
evidence (for a discussion of the way in which lay people conceptualise and 
experience uncertainty relating to environmental risks, see Powell, Dunwoody, Griffin 
& Neuwirth, 2007). Political and societal decisions about how (and indeed whether) 
to respond to climate change are fraught with uncertainties (Lorenzoni, Pidgeon & 
O’Connor, 2005; Oppenheimer, 2005) – and this is seen as a major barrier to public 
engagement with the issue (Lorenzoni, Nicholson-Cole & Whitmarsh, 2007 – where 
‘public engagement’ is defined as a personal connection with climate change 
comprising cognitive, emotional and behavioural aspects). 
 
                                                
1 The research in this manuscript is predicated on the uncontroversial scientific position that human 
activity is the primary forcing of current observed climate change. We take the mildly normative 
position that public awareness of and engagement with the issue of climate change, and the significant 
negative impacts it has on human and natural systems, is a desirable goal. We do not discuss these 
issues further in the main body of the paper. 
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The everyday meaning of uncertainty is negative, as it is commonly equated with 
ignorance (Shome & Marx, 2009). Pollack (2005) has suggested that the media and 
non-scientists in general tend to infer that scientists do not know anything about a 
topic, just because they do not know everything about it.  Corner and Hahn (2009) 
argue that the public perception of science, as a provider of knowledge and 
consistency, does not sit comfortably with the notion that scientific evidence may not 
always cohere. They reported an experiment in which people’s evaluations of science 
arguments were compared with their evaluations of non-science arguments. 
Participants viewed uncertainty as more problematic for the science arguments, and 
they rated the sources of scientific arguments containing mixed evidence as especially 
unreliable.  
 
Scientists are generally attuned to the difficulties of communicating uncertainty to the 
public. Frewer, Hunt, Brenna, Kuznesof and Ness (2003) found a widespread belief 
amongst scientists that the public are unable to conceptualize scientific uncertainties 
and that the communication of uncertainty would be interpreted as an ‘admission’ that 
their understanding of a subject was not complete. The communication of risk and 
uncertainty is a major challenge for the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC), which has attempted (not always successfully) to quantify and communicate 
the uncertainties around climate science (Budescu, Broomwell & Por, 2009; Harris & 
Corner, 2010; Patt & Schrag, 2003; Patt & Dessai, 2005). However, the 
overwhelming majority of information that people receive about climate change 
comes not through formal IPCC reports (which are designed for policy makers), but 
through verbal or written summaries of risk information, typically consumed via the 
media (Carvalho & Burgess, 2005).  
 
Among ordinary members of the public, there is a great deal of uncertainty about the 
reality and seriousness of climate change. A number of polls of public attitudes 
towards climate change have documented an increase in the degree of perceived 
uncertainty about anthropogenic climate change over the past three years (BBC, 2010; 
Gallup, 2009; Pew Research Centre, 2009; Spence, Venables, Pidgeon, Poortinga & 
Demski, 2010). Uncertainty about the impact of human activity on the climate is 
typically labelled ‘scepticism’, although the term is poorly understood. For example, 
Whitmarsh (2011) found that in the UK between 2003 and 2008 the belief that claims 
about climate change had been exaggerated almost doubled from 15% to 29%; 
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however, public uncertainty about climate change remained constant in most other 
respects. This suggests that an increase in scepticism about climate change may be 
manifested in quite specific attitudes about the way that climate change is 
communicated (rather than scepticism about climate science itself). 
 
These data on public opinion about climate change can be contrasted with a recent 
survey of active and publishing climate scientists. Among this group, Doran and 
Zimmerman (2009) found 97% agree that human activity is contributing to climate 
change. On the basic question of whether human activity is influencing the global 
climate there is very little uncertainty among climate scientists; there is a much 
greater degree of uncertainty among the general public about the reality and 
seriousness of anthropogenic influence on the climate than there is in the scientific 
community. This demonstrates that scepticism cannot be reduced to an assessment of 
the climate science – and also warrants a psychological explanation. 
 
Perceived uncertainty as a determinant of climate change scepticism 
Several factors have been identified as being important determinants of scepticism 
about climate change, including political ideology (Pew Research Centre, 2009; 
Whitmarsh, 2011), age and level of education (DEFRA, 2007, Whitmarsh, 2011), and 
differences in values (Dunlap, Grieneeks & Rokeach, 1983; Nilsson, Borgstede & 
Biel, 2004) and ‘worldviews’ (Kahan, Braman & Jenkins-Smith, 2010). One of the 
most important factors, however, is perceived uncertainty (Poortinga, Spence, 
Whitmarsh, Capstick & Pidgeon, 2011). 
 
Media-generated controversy is also often cited as a reason for scepticism about 
climate change (e.g. Antilla, 2005; Poortinga et al., 2011. Several analyses of media 
coverage of climate change have concluded that a discourse of uncertainty is unsuited 
to the typically adversarial style of English language journalism (Boykoff, 2007; 
Ward, 2008). Radio, television and newspaper reports have been criticised for 
interpreting too simplistically the notion of providing a ‘balanced’ set of views. This 
can lead to competing points of view on a scientific issue being presented as equally 
supported, when in fact they are not (Zehr, 2000; see also McCright & Shwom, 2010). 
There is some evidence that this trend is slowly changing (at least in the UK – 
Boykoff, 2007). However, Butler and Pidgeon (2009) have shown that people 
continue to view the media as offering a range of viewpoints on climate change, 
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creating the impression that the causes of climate change are more controversial than 
they actually are. 
 
Corbett and Durfee (2004) have emphasised that the word ‘uncertainty’ need not be 
present in an article in order for the science to be portrayed as uncertain – all that is 
necessary is that ‘duelling experts’ are presented without any sense of how the weight 
of evidence is distributed. For scientists and non-scientists, it would seem that 
managing uncertainty is a demanding task. Both prior attitudes and the presence of 
conflicting or opposing evidence (perhaps amplified by the norm of journalistic 
‘balance’) have been identified as contributing towards public uncertainty (or 
scepticism) about climate change. However, to date very few studies have yet sought 
to examine the effect of new information on people’s existing attitudes about climate 
change (for an exception see Corbett & Durfee, 2004).  
 
Biased assimilation and attitude polarisation 
There is a considerable body of social psychological literature focused on the impact 
of persuasive messages on attitudinal change (for a recent summary, see Maio & 
Haddock, 2010). Important factors influencing the impact of arguments and evidence 
on people’s attitudes include the perceived reliability of the source (Hahn, Harris & 
Corner, 2009), the level of personal involvement an individual has with a particular 
issue (Petty & Cacioppo, 1984) and personality characteristics such as the degree to 
which people are ‘open to change’ (Kruglanski, Webster & Klem, 1993). But one 
well-established and longstanding finding is that people with opposing prior attitudes 
process uncertain or conflicting evidence in a markedly different way.  
 
In a series of experiments across a number of attitudinal domains, it has been shown 
that individuals with opposing prior attitudes assimilate new information in a way that 
is consistent with their existing attitudinal position (termed ‘biased assimilation’); and 
that having assimilated information in a biased way, people with opposing attitudes 
may diverge in their opinions (known as ‘attitude polarisation’).2 Lord, Ross and 
Lepper (1979) provided the most famous demonstration of biased assimilation and 
attitude polarisation. They gave the same arguments for and against the death penalty 
to both supporters and opponents of capital punishment. Study participants seemed 
                                                
2 The term ‘biased’ does not indicate a judgment about the validity of a particular opinion. It is a formal 
term for a process that has been well documented in the social psychological literature: the tendency of 
individual s to assimilate new information in a way that is consistent with their existing attitudes. 
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not only to assimilate evidence in a biased way (i.e. selectively accept evidence that 
confirmed their existing view, while discounting evidence against it), but also to 
become more convinced of their initial views – despite being exposed to identical 
evidence. While evidence for biased assimilation has steadily accrued, subsequent 
research has raised questions over the ubiquity of attitude polarisation (see Kuhn & 
Lao, 1996; Miller, McHoskey, Bane & Dowd, 1993; Munro & Ditto, 1997; Plous, 
1991; Taber & Lodge, 2006), as it is more commonly found in measures of reported 
rather than actual attitude change.3 This suggests that the biased assimilation of 
information may sometimes occur independently of attitude polarisation. 
 
In summary, while actual attitude polarisation has been difficult to detect consistently 
in psychological studies, biased assimilation of information by individuals has been 
well documented across a number of attitudinal domains. No study has yet sought to 
apply the biased assimilation and polarisation paradigm to attitudes about climate 
change. Given that public uncertainty and scepticism has now become central to 
debates about climate change and is seen as a major barrier to public engagement 
(Lorenzoni et al, 2007), it seems important to establish whether attitudes about 
climate change also exhibit signs of biased assimilation and attitude polarisation. This 
was the goal of the experiment reported in the current paper – representing the first 
attempt to evaluate individual level attitude polarisation towards climate change in an 
experimental context. 
 
Experiment 
Studies of biased assimilation and attitude polarisation have typically provided 
participants with opposing arguments about a topic and measured their attitudes 
towards this topic before and after evaluating the arguments. Following this well-
established paradigm, we conducted an experiment at Cardiff University to examine 
whether individuals who expressed different attitudes about climate change would 
assimilate conflicting evidence about climate change in a biased way, and whether 
their attitudes towards climate change would subsequently become polarised. In order 
                                                
3 We discuss the difference between reported and actual attitude change in detail later in the paper – 
but actual attitude change would typically be measured by a ‘before-and-after’ method, where 
participants respond to a question asking them to state their current attitude towards a topic. Reported 
attitude change would typically be measured only once, after the provision of some information or 
stimuli, and would require participants to state whether their attitudes had changed since before the 
experiment was administered (i.e., a self-assessed change in attitudes).  
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to achieve this, we measured people’s scepticism about climate change before and 
after reading two ‘editorials’ that offered opposing arguments about climate change.  
 
Drawing on Hulme’s distinction between the science of climate change and its social, 
political and moral implications (Hulme, 2009), we created two newspaper editorials 
that presented conflicting views about climate change.  In one condition, the two 
opposing articles focussed on climate science (creating scientific uncertainty). In the 
other condition, the two opposing articles focussed on the political/moral dimensions 
of climate change (creating political/moral uncertainty – see Appendix 1 for the 
editorials). Patt (2007) has also distinguished between ‘model-based’ and ‘conflict-
based’ uncertainty – e.g., the difference between a 20% model confidence in an effect 
and 2 out of 10 experts expressing confidence in an effect. There are many other 
typologies of uncertainty (see, e.g., Tanner, Elvers & Jandrig, 2007), but our selection 
of Hulme’s distinction was motivated by our interest in the sorts of uncertainty one 
might encounter in a typical media editorial. 
 
The experiment was designed to answer the following questions: 
 
1) Do individuals with opposing attitudes towards climate change assimilate novel, 
conflicting information about climate change in a biased way and exhibit attitude 
polarisation? 
 
2) Do people respond differently to scientific versus political/moral uncertainty about 
climate change? 
 
Method 
Participants 
A total of 173 undergraduate students (155 female,4 age range 18-33, mean age = 
19.6) from the School of Psychology at Cardiff University took part in the experiment 
in exchange for course credit. Participants took part in groups of between 1-15 people, 
and were seated at individually screened stations. Participants were randomly 
                                                
4 A great deal of experimental psychology utilises ‘convenience samples’ – which typically means 
the undergraduates studying in the Psychology department where the researchers are based. In 
the UK, the gender ratio of Psychology undergraduates is almost always heavily skewed towards 
females, and this is reflected in our sample.  
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assigned to one of two experimental conditions (88 in the scientific uncertainty 
condition, 85 in the political/moral uncertainty condition). 
 
 
 
Design, Materials & Procedure 
The experiment was conducted using personal computers situated in a group 
laboratory. We recorded participants’ responses on a battery of measures before and 
after reading two editorials about climate change (described below).  
 
First, participants answered basic demographic questions, indicating their age, gender, 
political affiliation (if any) and membership of any environmental organisations. 
Next, using the 15-item New Ecological Paradigm (NEP; Dunlap et al., 2000) scale, 
known to be highly predictive of attitudes towards climate change (e.g., Bord et al., 
2000; Whitmarsh, 2011), participants indicated their views about the environment in 
general. This was measured on a seven-point scale from ‘Strongly Disagree’ (-3) to 
‘Strongly Agree’ (+3), where higher scores indicate a more pro-environmental 
worldview.  
 
Climate change scepticism was measured using a set of 17 statements on a five-point 
Likert scale from -2 ‘Strongly Disagree’ to +2 ‘Strongly Agree’ (see Table 1). This 
measure is an extended version of the scale developed by Whitmarsh (2011), where 
high scores indicate greater scepticism about climate change. The same scale was also 
administered after participants had read the newspaper editorials, in order to establish 
a ‘before-and-after’ measure of climate change scepticism.  
 
Table 1 about here 
 
Next, participants read the two editorials (printed on white A4 paper), before 
answering a second battery of measures. The editorials were constructed for the 
purpose of the study (see Appendix 1). In order to maximise the realism of the 
editorials, we presented them to participants as web-page printouts using the logos, 
formatting and font from two genuine newspapers - the Irish Times and the Scotsman. 
They were selected following pre-testing that established that these newspapers were 
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recognised, but not associated with any particular political views or position on 
climate change. 
 
There were two versions of the editorials. In one experimental condition, the two 
opposing articles focussed on climate science (one headline read ‘We are as certain 
about climate change as we are about anything’, the other read ‘If we can’t predict the 
weather, how can we predict the climate?’). These editorials were designed to 
generate scientific uncertainty. In the other condition, the two opposing articles 
focussed on the political/moral dimensions of climate change – one headline read ‘US 
politicians are committing treason against the planet’, while the other read ‘Why are 
environmentalists exaggerating claims about climate change?’ These editorials were 
designed to generate political/moral uncertainty, and were carefully constructed to be 
broadly equivalent on key dimensions such as overall length (between 220-240 
words), and the number of sources identified in the editorial (one per editorial), as 
message length and source attribution are factors known to be important determinants 
of message persuasiveness and argument strength (Hahn, Harris & Corner, 2009; 
Petty & Cacioppo, 1984). 
 
After reading both editorials, participants were required to indicate how convincing 
and how reliable they considered each article to be on five point scales from ‘Very 
Unconvincing’ (-2) to ‘Very Convincing’ (+2), and from ‘Very Unreliable’ (-2) to 
‘Very Reliable’ (+2) respectively. After evaluating the editorials, participants 
completed for the second time the set of questions designed to measure scepticism 
about climate change. Finally, participants were asked directly whether their attitudes 
towards climate change had altered after reading the editorials (a measure of ‘reported 
change’) on a nine-point scale from ‘Less convinced about climate change’ (-4) to 
‘More convinced about climate change’ (+4) with ‘My beliefs did not alter’ at the 
midpoint (0). The entire experiment took between 20-30 minutes for participants to 
complete. 
 
Results 
Prior attitudes 
Political affiliation was split fairly equally between the three main UK parties, with 
25% supporting Labour, 25% supporting the Liberal Democrats and 21% supporting 
the Conservatives. Almost 8% identified themselves as Green Party voters, while 5% 
Uncertainty & attitudes towards climate change 
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were a member of an environmental organisation. Reliability analysis of the NEP 
scale showed it to be internally consistent (Cronbach’s α = 0.73). The mean NEP 
score was 0.73 (SD = 0.60).  
 
The items on the scepticism about climate change scale formed a reliable measure of 
climate change scepticism (Cronbach’s α = 0.92; identical to that reported in 
Whitmarsh, 2011). Taking the sample as whole, the mean score was -0.24 (SD = 
0.62), indicating that the sample were marginally non-sceptical about climate change 
(higher scores – above 0 – indicate scepticism about climate change). A simple linear 
regression was conducted in order to establish which of the demographic or value 
variables predicted scepticism about climate change (see Table 2). The model 
accounted for 30% of the variance in scepticism scores, although only NEP score was 
a significant predictor of scepticism. Political affiliation, membership of 
environmental organisation, age and gender were non-significant predictors of climate 
change scepticism in this model. 
 
Table 2 about here 
 
Editorial evaluation: biased assimilation 
For the purpose of subsequent analyses, we divided participants into two groups on 
the basis of their median scores on the scepticism about climate change scale. Using a 
median split, we created a ‘sceptical’ group and a ‘non-sceptical’ group.5 The mean 
score in the non-sceptical group (n = 88) was - 0.75 (SD = 0.35), while the mean 
score in the sceptical group (n = 85) was 0.29 (SD = 0.36). 
 
Participants in the sceptical and non-sceptical groups evaluated the editorials in a 
markedly different way. Mean convincingness ratings are displayed in Figure 1 (data 
from both experimental conditions). Mean reliability ratings are displayed in Figure 2 
(data from both experimental conditions). 
 
Figure 1 and Figure 2 about here 
                                                
5 Despite the loss of statistical power associated with transforming a continuous variable into a 
categorical one, a median split (and the corresponding use of statistical Analyses of Variance) 
permitted us to observe evidence of polarization more clearly than continuous data and regression 
analyses. We repeated the analyses presented here using a different split (around the ‘absolute’ value of 
0 on the scepticism scale). The results did not differ, suggesting that a median-split was an appropriate 
way of analysing the data.  
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We conducted a repeated-measures ANOVA with level of scepticism (sceptical vs. 
non-sceptical) and experimental condition (scientific vs. political/moral uncertainty) 
as between-group variables, editorial type (Irish Times vs. Scotsman) as the within-
groups variable, and ratings of editorial convincingness as the dependent variable. We 
found no main effect of scepticism level, or editorial type. Crucially, there was a 
highly significant interaction between scepticism level and editorial type, F (1, 169) = 
41.24, p <.001. T-tests of the simple effects showed that non-sceptical participants 
rated the pro-climate change Irish Times editorial as significantly more convincing 
(M = .45, SD = .90) than the sceptical Scotsman editorial (M = -.36, SD = 1.12), t 
(171) = 3.00, p <.01, while sceptical individuals rated the Scotsman as significantly 
more convincing (M = .46, SD =1.10) than the Irish Times (M = .01, SD= 1.04), t 
(171) = -4.89, p <.001.  
 
There was also a significant main effect of experimental condition, with the science-
based editorials rated as significantly more convincing than the editorials that 
focussed on moral/political uncertainty, F (1, 169) = 8.35, p <.01. There were no 
significant interactions between experimental condition and either of the other 
variables, however, suggesting that the same pattern (i.e. biased assimilation) of 
convincingness ratings was observed in both experimental conditions. Follow-up 
analysis confirmed that this was the case (statistical analyses included in Appendix 2).  
 
The same analysis was conducted using ratings of the reliability of the editorials as a 
dependent variable. There was no main effect of level of scepticism, but there was a 
main effect of editorial type, with the Irish Times rated as significantly more reliable 
overall than the Scotsman, F (1, 169) = 13.66, p <.001. Once again there was a highly 
significant interaction between level of scepticism and editorial type, F (1, 169) = 
26.56, p <.001. T-tests of the simple effects showed that non-sceptical participants 
rated the pro-climate change Irish Times editorial as significantly more reliable (M = 
.41, SD = .94) than the sceptical Scotsman editorial (M = -.39, SD = 1.01), t (171) = 
3.07, p <.01, while sceptical individuals rated the Scotsman as significantly more 
reliable (M = .09, SD = .92) than the Irish Times (M = -.04, SD = .95), t (171) = -
3.27, p <.001.  
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Similarly to the convincingness ratings, there was a main effect of experimental 
condition, with the science-based editorial rated as significantly more reliable overall 
than the moral/political editorials, F (1, 169) = 8.63 , p <.01.6 There was no significant 
interaction between experimental condition and level of scepticism, although there 
was an interaction between experimental condition and reliability ratings, F (1, 169), 
= 6.01, p <.05. Follow-up analysis (statistical analyses included in Appendix 2) 
showed that in the political/moral uncertainty condition, the expected pattern of 
biased assimilation occurred. In the scientific uncertainty condition, however, 
sceptical participants attributed almost identical ratings of reliability to the pro-
climate change and sceptical editorials. In fact, the pro-climate change editorial was 
rated as marginally more reliable by the sceptical group, providing the only exception 
to the pattern of biased assimilation in the editorial evaluation measures.  
 
‘Actual’ attitude change – no attitude polarisation 
A repeated-measures ANOVA was conducted to establish whether attitudes towards 
climate change altered after reading the editorials. Mean scores on the scepticism 
scale (before vs. after reading the editorials) were entered as the within-groups 
variable, while experimental condition (scientific vs. political/moral uncertainty) and 
scepticism group (sceptical vs. non-sceptical) were included as between-groups 
variables. There was a significant within-group effect, as overall scepticism about 
climate change increased after reading the editorials, F (1, 169) = 11.28, p <.001. 
Interestingly, however, they did not cross the threshold into “scepticism territory” (i.e. 
a mean score greater than 0 on the scepticism scale). Taking the sample as a whole, 
the mean post-editorial scepticism scale score increased to -0.16 (SD=0.67), from -
0.24 (SD=.63) pre-editorial. There was also a main effect of level of scepticism, 
indicating that a significant difference between the sceptical and non-sceptical groups 
was maintained across the pre and post scepticism scores, F (1, 169) = 356.05, p 
<.001. There was no main effect of experimental condition, nor any interactions 
between experimental condition and the other variables – attitude change was not 
impacted by the type of editorials participants read. Crucially, there was no interaction 
                                                
6 In both convincingness and reliability ratings, the scientific editorials were rated more highly than the 
editorials that focussed on moral/political uncertainty. This indicates that the two experimental 
conditions were not equivalent. However, we were not seeking to construct editorials of equivalent 
strength (which would be challenging for multiple reasons), but to compare participants’ responses to 
the different types of uncertainty – scientific and moral/political – generated through the conflicting 
articles. 
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between level of scepticism and pre/post scepticism scores. As Figure 3 shows, we 
observed no evidence of polarisation in attitudes. 
 
Figure 3 about here 
 
While the scepticism scale as a whole showed that participants shifted uniformly 
towards greater scepticism, analysis by individual questions suggested some 
interesting variation between items on the scale (see Table 3). In fact, there were only 
a few items which showed significant changes, including significant increase in 
agreement with the item “I do not believe climate change is a real problem”. 
Strikingly, significant changes in pre/post ratings of individual items were evident for 
items about the reliability of scientific evidence, complexity and expert disagreement 
– suggesting that these are the specific attitudes about climate change that are most 
susceptible to perceived uncertainty. 
 
Table 3 about here 
  
‘Reported’ attitude change – some evidence of polarisation 
A between-groups ANOVA was conducted with experimental condition and level of 
scepticism as the independent variables, and degree of reported change as the 
dependent measure. There was no effect of experimental condition. However, 
participants in the non-sceptical group reported becoming marginally but significantly 
(F (1, 172) = 16.08, p <.001) more convinced about climate change after reading the 
editorials (M = .17, SD = 1.00), while participants in the sceptical group reported 
becoming less convinced (M = -.45, SD = .1.01). Thus, in the measure of self-
reported change (and in keeping with previous research on attitude polarisation) there 
was some evidence of attitude polarisation.  
 
Discussion 
The current research was designed to address two key questions. Firstly, whether 
individuals with opposing attitudes towards climate change would assimilate novel, 
conflicting information about climate change in a biased way and exhibit attitude 
polarisation, and secondly whether people would respond differently to different types 
of conflicting evidence about climate change (i.e. scientific or political/moral 
uncertainty). The results represent the first attempt to apply the well-established 
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biased assimilation and attitude polarisation paradigm to the practically important 
topic of attitudes about climate change. 
 
With regard to the first question, our results provide strong evidence that individuals 
with opposing attitudes towards climate change assimilate novel, conflicting 
information about climate change in a biased way. When participants were split into 
two groups (‘sceptical’ and ‘non-sceptical’), they evaluated two editorials positing 
opposing arguments about climate change in a markedly different way. Participants 
seemed to evaluate the convincingness and reliability of the editorials according to 
their existing attitudes: those with greater prior scepticism about climate change rated 
the sceptical editorial as more convincing and more reliable than the pro-climate 
change editorial (and vice versa for less sceptical participants). This finding is 
consistent with the large body of literature that has previously demonstrated the 
biased assimilation of evidence by people with opposing views on a number of 
different topics (see, e.g., Kuhn & Lao, 1996; Lord et al, 1979; Munro & Ditto, 1997), 
and suggests that attitudes about climate change are likely to be subject to the same 
psychological demands and tensions as other ‘controversial’ subjects.  
 
We observed only limited evidence of attitude polarisation. The sample as a whole 
became slightly (but significantly) more sceptical about climate change after reading 
the editorials. However, this shift was fairly uniform – there was no evidence from 
participants’ pre- and post- editorial attitudes that individuals with opposing attitudes 
about climate change had diverged even further (the signature of attitude 
polarisation). Using a measure of ‘reported’ change (i.e. when participants were asked 
to indicate whether they thought their attitudes had changed), we found some 
evidence of polarisation – again, in keeping with the existing literature on assimilation 
and polarisation.  Theoretically, our results add to the body of evidence that suggests 
biased assimilation and attitude polarisation may be independent constructs – as 
biased assimilation can often be found without strong evidence of polarisation (Kuhn 
& Lao, 1996). 
 
With regard to the second question – whether people would respond differently to 
scientific or moral/political uncertainty – we observed no impact of experimental 
condition on actual or reported attitude change. In the reliability ratings of the 
science-based editorials, we observed the only exception to the pattern of biased 
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assimilation – sceptical participants did not perceive the sceptical science-based 
editorial as more reliable than the pro-climate change editorial. This finding suggests 
that the biasing influence of prior attitudes may be less powerful when the 
information under consideration is based on (relatively objective) facts and figures, 
rather than political opinion and conjecture.  
 
A limitation of the current paper is the convenience sample used – like many 
experimental psychology studies the sample was skewed towards female participants, 
and was comprised exclusively of undergraduate students studying Psychology. The 
use of such a sample was borne out of practical constraints on resources for 
conducting the research – but the risk of relying on a sample of Psychology students 
is that they may have knowledge about the experimental task, or anticipate a level of 
deception that other participants would not (see Corner, Harris & Hahn, 2009, for a 
discussion of the ‘pragmatics’ of experimental participation). It is not possible to 
eliminate this risk entirely, but qualitative measures were included in the battery of 
questions administered during the experiment, providing space for participants to 
indicate more general thoughts about the materials, and their reasons for changing 
their attitudes in response to the newspaper editorials. Although for reasons of space 
we do not report an analysis of these data, there was no indication that participants 
anticipated the deception or the aim of the experiment.  
 
We are following up the experimental data reported here using a nationally 
representative sample – and the results of this will provide an important test of the 
validity of our initial investigation into climate change attitude polarisation. Other 
work conducted by the authors (e.g., Lorenzoni et al., 2007; Whitmarsh, 2011) has 
also sought to ‘triangulate’ different research methodologies (qualitative as well as 
quantitative) to provide even stronger evidence for the existence of patterns and trends 
in climate change scepticism. But even on the basis of the current findings, there are 
several implications for understanding how the public may respond to uncertain or 
conflicting information about climate change – whether it is scientific or 
moral/political in nature. 
 
Firstly, the provision of conflicting evidence – both scientific and moral/political 
uncertainty – had the effect of increasing scepticism (albeit marginally) among both 
groups of participants. In keeping with the perception (expressed by scientists in 
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Frewer et al., 2003) that the communication of uncertainty is often interpreted as 
evidence that a subject is poorly understood, single item analyses found that 
participants in both experimental groups showed a significant decrease in the extent to 
which they perceived scientists to be in agreement, and a significant increase in the 
belief that climate change evidence is unreliable. This poses something of a dilemma 
for those seeking to communicate uncertainty: an increased focus on the areas in 
which uncertainties remain may be interpreted as evidence that the case for 
anthropogenic climate change is weaker than it actually is. Thus, although the 
message may be technically more accurate, it may simultaneously be less accurately 
interpreted (from the perspective of the intended audience).  
 
A pertinent practical example of this ‘uncertainty dilemma’ is the ongoing UK 
Climate Impacts Programme which produces regional and national projections of 
climate change for the UK. The latest report (UKCIP, 2009) is meticulous in its 
treatment of uncertainty, even incorporating a short tutorial in interpreting Bayesian 
(probabilistic) data. But while the inclusion of uncertainty information is designed to 
act as a communication aid, the evidence reported in the current paper suggests that 
this may not always be the outcome. One response to the uncertainty dilemma is 
provided by Morton, Rabinovich, Marshall and Bretschneider (2010): they found that 
when uncertainty was used to indicate that losses might not happen if cautious action 
is taken to prevent them (i.e. a positive framing of the uncertainty information), then 
people were more likely to indicate stronger intentions to act in a pro-environmental 
way. Morton et al concluded that uncertainty is not an inevitable barrier to action, 
provided communicators frame climate change messages in ways that trigger cautious 
action in the face of uncertainty (rather than avoidance or inaction).   
 
Secondly, although more and more information about climate change is being 
disseminated, this information is unlikely to be assimilated in the same way by people 
who initially differ in their assessment of the reality and seriousness of climate 
change. This means that while the evidence for anthropogenic climate change grows 
stronger, uncertainty remains on the social, economic, moral and political aspects of 
climate change. The challenge for climate change communicators will be to ensure 
that scientific uncertainties and political uncertainties are, as far as possible, not 
conflated, since it is the latter domains where the effects of biased assimilation and 
attitude polarisation seem to be most dominant (see also Pidgeon & Fischhoff, 2011, 
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for a discussion on non-persuasive communication). The current research examined 
one distinction between types of uncertainty – scientific and moral/political – but 
there are clearly others that would also warrant investigation (extending, for example, 
the work of Patt, 2007 on the difference between perceptions of model-based and 
conflict-based uncertainty in science; or of Poortinga et al. (2011) who distinguish 
trend, attribution, and impact uncertainties within a UK public sample).  
 
Finally, our results suggest that as more entrenched positions are taken up on the topic 
of climate change by members of the public, message-based campaigns to engage the 
public with climate change may have less value. Given the value basis of climate 
change perceptions, evident from our regression analysis and several previous studies 
(e.g., Whitmarsh, 2011), constructive climate change communication should promote 
dialogue and focus on exposing and discussing values and trade-offs between them 
(Shwom, Bidwell, Dan & Dietz, 2010). Deliberative fora are more appropriate than 
unidirectional communication for achieving this deeper level of debate and discourse; 
furthermore, by encouraging systematic (rather than superficial) processing of 
information (Petty & Cacioppo, 1984), deliberation is more likely to lead to the 
durable attitudinal and behavioural changes that are crucial for increasing public 
engagement with climate change.  
 
Future work should seek to further disentangle the factors that determine how 
uncertainty impacts on perceptions of climate change. Testing additional examples of 
‘moral/political’ and ‘scientific’ uncertainty (as well as exploring different typologies 
of uncertainty) would provide important evidence of the generalisability of the current 
results. Of course, the frequent blurring of the distinction between the different types 
of uncertainty associated with debates about climate change may explain why 
reasoning about climate change is vulnerable to the effect of biased information 
processing – the science and the political/social implications of climate change are 
often, but unhelpfully, presented as interchangeable in the communication of climate 
change messages. 
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Table Captions 
 
Table 1: Items in the climate change scepticism scale 
 
Table 2: Standardised coefficients from a linear regression analysis of scores on the 
scepticism scale (R2=.30). 
 
Table 3:  Mean pre/post scores for selected items from the scepticism scale. Only 
those items with significant changes (amongst either group, or both) are shown (in 
bold typeface), and significance is indicated by t-statistics. 
 
 
 
Uncertainty & attitudes towards climate change 
 25 
Figure Captions 
 
Figure 1: Mean convincingness ratings assigned to the editorials by ‘non-sceptical’ 
and ‘sceptical’ groups (data from both experimental conditions). 
 
Figure 2: Mean reliability ratings assigned to editorials by ‘non-sceptical’ and 
‘sceptical’ groups (data from both experimental conditions). 
 
Figure 3: Attitude change amongst ‘non-sceptical’ and ‘sceptical’ groups (data from 
both experimental conditions).  
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Table 1 
* reverse scored 
 
 
 
1	   Climate	  change	  is	  too	  complex	  and	  uncertain	  for	  scientists	  to	  make	  useful	  forecasts	  	  
2	   Claims	  that	  human	  activities	  are	  changing	  the	  climate	  are	  exaggerated	  	  
3	   The	  media	  is	  often	  too	  alarmist	  about	  issues	  like	  climate	  change	  	  
4	   I	  do	  not	  believe	  climate	  change	  is	  a	  real	  problem	  	  
5	   Floods	  and	  heat-­‐waves	  are	  not	  increasing,	  there	  is	  just	  more	  reporting	  of	  it	  in	  the	  media	  these	  days	  	  
6	   Climate	  change	  is	  just	  a	  natural	  fluctuation	  in	  Earth’s	  temperatures	  	  
7	   It	  is	  too	  early	  to	  say	  whether	  climate	  change	  is	  really	  a	  problem	  	  
8	   There	  is	  too	  much	  conflicting	  evidence	  about	  climate	  change	  to	  know	  whether	  it	  is	  actually	  happening	  
9	   Too	  much	  fuss	  is	  made	  about	  climate	  change	  	  
10	   The	  evidence	  for	  climate	  change	  is	  unreliable	  	  
11	   Many	  leading	  experts	  still	  question	  if	  human	  activity	  is	  contributing	  to	  climate	  change	  
12	   I	  am	  uncertain	  about	  whether	  climate	  change	  is	  really	  happening	  	  
13*	   There	  is	  solid	  evidence	  that	  the	  Earth	  is	  warming	  because	  of	  human	  activities	  
14*	   Recent	  floods	  and	  heat-­‐waves	  in	  this	  country	  are	  due	  to	  climate	  change	  	  
15*	   I	  am	  convinced	  that	  climate	  change	  is	  really	  happening	  	  
16*	   Experts	  are	  agreed	  that	  climate	  change	  is	  a	  real	  problem	  	  
17*	   Changes	  in	  climate	  over	  the	  last	  100	  years	  are	  mainly	  caused	  by	  human	  activities	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Table 2 
	   B	   Std.	  Error	   β 	  
Gender	   0.05	   0.13	   0.03	  
Age	   -­‐0.01	   0.02	   -­‐0.02	  
Politics	  (Conservative)	   0.06	   0.12	   0.04	  
Politics	  (Liberal	  Democrat)	   0.01	   0.12	   0.01	  
Politics	  (Green)	   0.17	   0.17	   0.07	  
Politics	  (Would	  Not	  Vote)	   0.12	   0.13	   0.07	  
Politics	  (Other	  or	  Prefer	  not	  to	  Say)	   -­‐0.09	   0.19	   -­‐0.03	  
Member	  of	  environmental	  organisation	   -­‐0.30	   0.19	   -­‐0.11	  
Mean	  score	  on	  NEP	  Scale	   -­‐0.53	   0.07	   -­‐0.51*	  
Politics	  (Labour)	  excluded	  from	  regression	  model	  due	  to	  exceeding	  collinearity	  tolerance	  
*	  p	  >	  .001	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Table 3 
	   	   ‘Non-­‐sceptical’	  group	  (N=89)	   ‘Sceptical’	  group	  (N=88)	  
	   Means	   	   	   	   Means	   	   	   	  
	  	   Pre	   Post	   SD	   t	   Sig.	  (2-­‐tailed)	   Pre	   Post	   SD	   t	   Sig.	  (2-­‐tailed)	  
Climate	  change	  is	  too	  complex	  and	  
uncertain	  for	  scientists	  to	  make	  
useful	  forecasts	  
-­‐.29	   -­‐.35	   .93	   -­‐.57	   .57	   .49	   .69	   .95	   2.02	   .05	  
I	  do	  not	  believe	  climate	  change	  is	  a	  
real	  problem	  
-­‐1.34	   -­‐1.17	   .63	   2.54	   .01	   -­‐.40	   -­‐.17	   .84	   2.54	   .01	  
Experts	  are	  agreed	  that	  climate	  
change	  is	  a	  real	  problem1	  
-­‐.93	   -­‐.47	   1.14	   3.82	   .00	   -­‐.27	   -­‐.06	   1.01	   2.00	   .05	  
The	  evidence	  for	  climate	  change	  is	  
unreliable	  
-­‐.87	   -­‐.55	   .94	   3.17	   .00	   .38	   .70	   .89	   3.46	   .00	  
Mean	  score	  on	  Scepticism	  Scale	   -­‐.75	   -­‐.65	   .34	   2.65	   .01	   .28	   .37	   .31	   2.62	   .01	  
1	  Reverse	  scored
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